Abstract. Uniquely among contemporary philosophies, Roy Bhaskar's system of critical realism and metaReality attempts to sublate (draw out the real strengths of and surpass) the philosophical discourse of modernity considered as a dialectically developing totality. This paper systematically expounds and comments on Bhaskar's metacritique of that discourse and situates it briefly in relation to Jürgen Habermas's earlier critique. 
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Introduction
The philosophical discourse of modernity (PDM) is the revolutionary philosophical discourse, the hallmark of which is the self-defining subject, 3 that accompanied the rise and consolidation of the capitalist system from its birth in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to its current globalizing phase. It displaced a philosophical discourse in which people defined themselves in relation to a cosmic order viewed as intrinsically meaningful, valuable and sacred, and will in due course in turn be displaced, perhaps by critical realism, 4 which aspires to sublate (i.e. synthesize and transcend) it. Except in the contingent matter of its origins, the PDM is not an intrinsically European or Eurocentric phenomenon. It is the philosophical reflection of the globalizing dynamic of the capitalist mode of production which obtains at the level of the real regardless of which particular centrism holds sway in the regions that it invades, 5 although its actual effects will be strongly mediated by local conditions: a facet of the first genuinely world order, centre-periphery system 6 or (in critical realist terms) global master-slave-type society 7 rather than an independent European, thence American, phenomenon. Thus, although the discourse is currently dominated by the European-American philosophical community, who are 'authorized' to set the latest fashions, this is likely to change when the epicentre of the world-system changes. The concept of modernity for Bhaskar is closely bound up with the phenomenon of geo-historicity. Borrowing from Claude Lévi-Strauss, Bhaskar distinguishes the 'cold', concrete societies of Indigenous peoples who have no sense of history, i.e. in which the present is experienced as the endur-3 'Modernity can and will no longer borrow the criteria by which it takes its orientation from the models supplied by another epoch; it has to create its normativity out of itself ' (Habermas [1985 ' (Habermas [ ] 1987 . See also Taylor 1992. 4 Unless the context indicates otherwise, 'critical realism' is used throughout in its extended sense to include dialectical critical realism and the philosophy of metaReality.
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' [T] he real force underpinning [the dichotomies and dualisms of the PDM] was nothing else than the remorseless logic of the nascent capitalist mode of production and exploitation of nature and human beings alike, a dynamic and self-expanding form of exploitation without precedent in human history, in which an unconstrained and unconscious conatus or drive to accumulation is hurtling humanity (and with it the planet) into crisis at all four planes of social being' (Bhaskar 2002b, 172 n. 7; cf. 64 : 'Simply put, I think modernism is a very pure ideology of the capitalist mode of production').
ing perpetuation of the past (a common view of non-master-slave peoples), from 'hot' historicized societies in which the present is seen as radically different from the past, a product of change over time. Geo-historicity is both (1) the quality of having such a self-reflexive consciousness of history, a quality that is caught in the fundamental critical realist concept of epistemic relativity; and (2) that to which the consciousness refers, the quality of spatializing diachronic change that is exhibited by all societies, though at widely varying rates. At a meta-level, (3), geo-historicity is conceptually a derivative of absence, embracing the whole of Being, not just human being. Geo-historicity (3) is thus any process of directional change in the multiverse, e.g. geological. Geo-historicity (1) -the self-reflexive consciousness of change -is a relatively recent, emergent phenomenon, roughly contemporaneous with the first 'axial' civilizations or the rise of master-slave-type societies. Indeed, it presupposes the other two defining features of axiality: the enhancement of reflexivity and of agentiality.
8 However, hunter-foragers 'certainly had a past (and outside)' 9 in the sense that they lived in the full presence of their ancestor-creators and myths, with a keen sense of their own origins and distinct identity within the cosmic order; and hot societies have it in common with them that, according to the ruling ideologies, there 8 The concept of axiality derives from the thematization by Karl Jaspers (who drew on similar notions dating back to the eighteenth century, but especially in the work of Max Weber) of an Achsenzeit or Axial Age c. 800-200 bce that witnessed, relatively independently in a range of regions, a multi-faceted socio-cultural revolution, pivotal for the subsequent course of geo-history, in China, India, ancient Israel, Greece and (more controversially) the Near East and Egypt, a key feature of which was the discovery or enhancement of historicity, reflexivity and agentiality (Jaspers [1949 (Jaspers [ ] 2010 . For recent analysis of the Achsenzeit and its influence in geo-history see Arnason et al., eds, 2005 . For an argument that the pre-Columbian civilizations of Mesoamerica and the Andean region experienced their own Axial revolution, see 1995. This is congruent with the view of Arnason et al. (2005, 3) that, while from one point of view the Axial Age is 'a historical period with more or less clearly defined chronological boundaries', from another 'the structural aspects supposedly common to the cultural breakthroughs of the Axial Age would seem to distinguish one type of civilization from others, and examples of this type might emerge in different historical settings, not only those of the original Axial Age. It might, in other words, be appropriate to speak of axial civilizations as a general category with an open-ended historical field of application, rather than civilizations of the Axial Age.' Such considerations issue in a concept of 'multiple axialities', allowing for interpreting e.g. the rise of Islam 'as a new axial civilization' (Arnason et al. 2005, 3-5, 8 ). Bhaskar's concept of 'master-slave-type societies' is a more abstract and general category that constellationally embraces the axial civilizations as well as their successors on the stage of world history. His principle of 'axial rationality', coupled with the axiom of universal solidarity, and grounded together with it in the practical order, provides a metatheoretical basis for the resolution of disputes (Bhaskar with Hartwig 2010, 80-1, 198 is no future, in the sense that qualitative social change is unthinkable: from the perspective of total history, even as historicity (1) emerged in hot societies, it was frozen by endism and ontological monovalence, such that there was a history once, but not any longer (Marx) (see §5, below). Hot societies, including those of our own modernity, are thus only 'half' geo-historicized, split between past and future -the dominant outlook lacks a sense of the 'futuricity of praxis' 10 -and rampant eternization of the status quo de-geohistoricizes. A eudaimonian society, by contrast, would be fully historicized, combining an awareness both (a) of radical departure from the past and (b) of future change as necessary and desirable for human flourishing with a (re-)enchanted view of the cosmos as the unfolding of Being and of its own continuity and connectedness with this process -'embracing process and change, openness to the future as an essential part of our being'. 11 We would live our lives in the moment, but in the full presence both of the past and of the future, such that the distanciated present was present to itself -not absent, as in the 'fast-twitch' punctualist here-now of market societies. World geo-historicity (2), whereby all human societies are caught up in the globalizing process of capital, constituting a new 'rhythmic', was inaugurated in the dawn of modernity as we know it.
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Habermas on the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity
The concept of the philosophical discourse of modernity as a unified phenomenon first gained widespread currency with the publication of Jürgen Habermas's book of the same name in 1985. Habermas's critique of the PDM commences with G. W. F. Hegel, the first European philosopher to develop a clear concept of modernity, and his critique of the subject-centred reason of the European Enlightenment, but is focused largely on the discourse of postmodernity and its radical relativization and reduction of reason, in order to 'identify and clearly mark out a road indicated but not taken: the determinate negation of subject-centred reason by reason understood as communicative action' -the replacement of the subjectivist '"paradigm of consciousness"' and postmodernism by an intersubjectivist '"paradigm of communicative action"' in which reason is construed in terms of unforced 'mutual understanding and reciprocal recognition'. 13 It is a powerful critique that has a good deal in common with Bhaskar's, and other aspects of the PDM elsewhere in his oeuvre, but from a critical realist point of view these critiques are seriously flawed. Thus, first, Habermas's critique of positivism and empiricism leaves the positivist account of a causal law and science intact in relation to the natural world, issuing in 'an instrumentalist-manipulative conception of the interest informing the natural … sciences and the sphere of labour'.
14 There is arguably much more to science and knowledge-constitutive interests than instrumental rationality or strategic action. For critical realism, science, including natural science, properly understood and practised, has a vital role to play in ethics and emancipation -in arriving at the understanding to which the 'paradigm of mutual understanding' aspires. Bhaskar [1989] 2010, 188; see also Bhaskar [1986 Bhaskar [ ] 2009 [1991 2002b, 38 . As a neo-Kantian who, like Weber, seeks to combine positivism with hermeneuticism, Habermas is vulnerable to the main thrust of the critical realist critique of both those traditions. See especially Bhaskar [1979 Bhaskar [ ] 1998 There is no counterpart in Habermas of the Bhaskarian theory of explanatory critique, which effects transitions from facts to values and theory to practice and concludes that 'social theory just is moral philosophy, but as science' (Bhaskar [1991 In the 1980s Bhaskar reconstructed the mature Marx as a scientific realist (see especially Bhaskar [1989] 2010, ch. 7, 'Dialectics, materialism and theory of knowledge', 115-45). Bhaskar's Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom ([1993] 2008), as Alan Norrie has suggested to me, provides a way of construing the thought of Marx, both 'young' and 'mature', and its concern with ethics and political economy, alienation and exploitation, as a developmental unity. 17 Habermas 1976; 1987, Lecture 3, 'Excursus on the obsolescence of the production paradigm '. 18 '[I]f there is a sense in which the ideal community, founded on principles of truth, freedom and justice, is already present as a prefiguration in every speech-interaction, might one not be tempted to suppose that equality, liberty and fraternity are present in every transaction or material exchange …? It is an error to suppose that ethics must have a linguistic foundation; just as it is an error to suppose that it is autonomous from science or history' (Bhaskar [1986 (Bhaskar [ ] 2009 . Cf. Norrie 2010, 123-4, 225, 228-30. This leads Habermas to reject a concept of emancipation, a version of which is defended by Bhaskar, Underpinning these weaknesses are a number of meta-errors.
(1) As a protagonist of the 'linguistic turn', Habermas commits a linguistified version of the epistemic fallacy -'Habermas's Kantian project of attempting to render ontological mediations as epistemological divisions '. 25 This vitiates his entire critique of postmodernism because he shares with his opponents the same fundamental mistake, enshrined in the slogans 'postmetaphysics', 'postphilosophy' and 'postontology', which fail to discriminate between traditional metaphysics or first philosophy, on the one hand, which critical realism likewise renounces, and transcendental or scientific realism and the ontological realism it vindicates, on the other. 26 Habermas has been a scathing critic of ontology, which Bhaskar re-vindicates. For Bhaskar philosophy can reveal relatively necessary truths about the fundamental contours of Being and enjoys a relative autonomy from science; for Habermas, philosophy's role is 20 See e.g. Dews 1986, 16; Habermas 1986, 177. 21 Habermas [1985] 1987, 40. 22 See e.g. Dussel [ ] 1995 Dussel [ , 9-10, 25, 32-5, 129-30 and [1993 Dussel [ ] 1996 Dussel [1993] 1995, 25. 24 vandenberghe 2010, 3.
25 Bhaskar [1986 Bhaskar [ ] 2009 cf. 2002b, 38. 26 For the difference between traditional and Bhaskarian metaphysics, see Bhaskar [1986] 2009, ch. 1.3, 'Metaphysics and method', 10-27. rather merely to integrate the results of the sciences into a coherent account of human history and prospects, abandoning the philosophy of history in favour of a theory of social evolution. Like all denegators of ontology, Habermas and the postmodernists operate with a tacit ontology -of actualism and empirical and/or conceptual realism. 27 Habermas's deduction of a conatus to mutual understanding immanent within discourse can be seen as 'a partial move into ontology by a philosopher who otherwise denies it'. 28 (2) Relatedly,
Habermas is ensnared within the antinomy of transcendental pragmatism:
[I]f nature has the transcendental … status of a constituted objectivity, then it cannot yield the historical or empirical ground of the constituting subjectivity or knowledge; conversely if nature is the historical ground of subjectivity and/or an empirical ground of knowledge, it cannot be regarded solely as a constituted or posited objectivity: it must be essentially in-itself (and only, so to speak, contingently a possible object of knowledge for us).
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In short, humanity cannot both be constituted by and constitute the natural world. (3) Habermas's theory of truth acknowledges only three of the four moments of Bhaskar's theory (the theory of the truth tetrapolity) -fiduciary, adequating and expressive-referential (intersubjective or consensual) truth; it lacks a concept of truth as most fundamentally ontological and alethicthe truth of things as distinct from propositions, i.e. truth as real, existing objectively, independently of our access to it, as the real reasons for things from the point of view of the possibility of human practice. 30 Finally, (4) Habermas's anti-naturalism marginalizes the extra-communicative or extradiscursive constraints on human agency in his ethical theory only to have them return with a vengeance in the theory of communicative action in the form of the colonization of lifeworld by system (the economy and state apparatuses co-ordinated by the non-linguistic media of money and power), reproducing the Kantian antinomy 'between phenomenal system and noumenal lifeworld' -a 'return' that is related to Habermas's Weberian attempt to marry hermeneuticism with positivism. 31 The prospect Habermas's philosophy offers is thus 'that "the public space of more or less good reasons" cannot be maintained as it is swallowed up by the structural violence' that he acknowledges permeates modern societies. 32 Unlike Bhaskar, Habermas fails 27 See e.g. Habermas [1985 Habermas [ ] 1987 Norrie 2010, 225; Bhaskar 2002b, 82; Outhwaite 1994, 40-41. 28 Norrie 2010, 230. 29 Bhaskar [1986 , 7-8 n. 18, original emphasis, paraphrasing and expanding McCarthy 1978 Bhaskar Hartwig 2007a. 31 Bhaskar Norrie 2010, 123-4. 32 Norrie 2010, 229. to draw the conclusion that, for universal free flourishing to be possible, discursively moralized power 2 relations must be abolished in their entirety, and to develop an emancipatory axiology that embraces this.
The Elements of the Bhaskarian Critique
Bhaskar's critique of the PDM had been initiated (though not under that rubric) in 1975 with the publication of his first book, A Realist Theory of Science and, because his philosophical method is one of 'transcendental critique ', 33 in which transcendental arguments for realist positions simultaneously yield immanent critiques of rival discourses, it was ongoing from that time. In the first two years of the new millennium, stimulated by visits to India, where modernity, modernization and globalization were (and are) hot topics in the academy, Bhaskar drew the threads of his ongoing critique together in a lapidary overview in his books articulating the new philosophy of metaReality (PMR), 34 the thematization of which indeed the ongoing critique feeds powerfully into. Bhaskar [1993 Bhaskar [ and [1994 2010. The concept of the West or Occident nicely exemplifies modernity's penchant for (explicit) exclusion but (tacit) inclusion of the nonmodern Other (which I come on to below) in relation to the South of the Western hemisphere: Africa and Latin America. For critiques of the correlative concept of the Orient that chime with critical realism, see Said 1993 and Dirlik 1997. universal concretely singularized human flourishing in nature is an object/ ive immanent in human practice, issuing, if realized, in a richly diverse planetary civilization of free flourishing that is not dominated by a world-system and discourse of modernity as we know it. 37 But, like that of Habermas, as well as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's earlier critique of the philosophy of modernity, 38 and true to the logic of immanent critique, the fundamental impetus of Bhaskar's critique, as of his philosophy generally, is the transcendence and healing of division and split in a reconciliation that sees an end to the blind domination of nature and humans by humans. This, in essence, is 'the critical realist embrace'. 39 However, while the motivating vision of Bhaskar and Habermas is similar, the way they carry it through is very different. Bhaskar explicitly situates the trajectory of critical realism itself within the wider context of the PDM, pointing out that by no means all aspects of the tradition are regressive and that critical realism itself 'constitutes so many successive critiques' of its phases, 40 the rise of each of which was associated with a revolutionary or counter-revolutionary transition or upheaval. The link with social upheaval is underlined because for Bhaskar the problems of philosophy are closely bound up, or 'resonate', with the problems of social life, and are to be explained in terms of them more fundamentally than in terms of philosophy's intrinsic dynamics; and revolutionary transformations conform to the non-arbitrary criterion for significant social change generated by critical realism's transformational model of social activity.
41
This means (1) that the development of critical realism is characterized by a process of double immanent critique -first of the PDM, and second of its own previous phases -isolating and remedying, or suggesting remedies for, 37 Cf. Enrique Dussel's concept of 'transmodernity', which, however, has the disadvantage conceptually, like 'postmodernism', of including that which it wants to move beyond -although drawing on modernity, transmodernity seeks to 'overcome modernity in all its aspects' in a move to a new planetary pluriverse 'that is not an age of multiple modernities of the former kind' (Dussel 2010, Abstract). Dussel's 'liberation philosophy' has much in common with Bhaskar's philosophy of emancipation, including the grounding of emancipatory ethics in agency as well as discourse, but is considerably more hermeneutical and phenomenological in orientation, seeking to marry the insights of the linguistic turn with Marx and, relatively to critical realism, lacking in conceptual rigour and a metatheoretically grounded method of argument. See Dussel [1980 Dussel [ ] 1985 Dussel [ ] 1996 Dussel [ , and 2003 Alcoff and Mendieta, eds, 2000. 38 Horkheimer and Adorno [1947] 1973. 39 Bhaskar with Hartwig 2010, ch. 5, 'The critical realist embrace: critical naturalism (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) ', 74-90; Hartwig 2009b . 40 Bhaskar 2002b See Bhaskar [1979 Bhaskar [ ] 1998 Bhaskar [ , [1994 incompletenesses in each case; and (2) that critical realism is not anti-modern in a regressive or undialectical sense. However, it does maintain that the PDM is fundamentally inimical to universal free flourishing, for which we need to move on to a radically different worldview that incorporates its real strengths. Modernity does have its crowning glories, in particular the idea, as fully developed in dialectical critical realism and metaReality, of rich individualism: concretely singularized individual human flourishing in nature; but this is often misrecognized by the PDM as atomistic egocentric individualism.
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The phases of the PDM (together with their associated socio-political revolution) are:
1. Classical modernism (CM) (the moment of the birth and consolidation of the capitalist world system, involving the global colonial expansion of Europe and the accompanying socio-cultural-political revolutions of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; or, 'the advent of world history', when 'both time and geo-history moved up a gear'). While distinct, all these phases are, like those of critical realism itself, moments in a developmental process, the later phases of which partially critique and deepen but also continue (or constellationally contain) what was implicit in the earlier phases, such that, considered synchronically, they can be collapsed like a folding telescope or a Russian nesting doll: T/F > PM > M > HM > CM. They are unified above all by a 'tremendous' underlying error: 44 ontological monovalence leading to triumphalism and endism (already implicit in the first or base phase), and so constitute a dialectical totality. Ontological monovalence is the view, underpinned ultimately by fear of change on the part of ruling elites, that Being is purely positive, devoid of the negativity that is transcendentally necessary for change to occur. 45 It puts a stop to history on behalf of the master-classes, and this is the secret social meaning of the very distinction between the modern and the non-modern: 'once you say we moderns, we have arrived, then you rule out the possibility of change'. 46 Alongside but more fundamental than the epistemic fallacy and the collapse of structure and natural necessity in actualism, ontological monovalence is the third great error of Western philosophy. It is refuted by the transcendental deduction of the category of absence or real negation and contrasts with ontological polyvalence, which vindicates the reality of absence and absenting and embraces change.
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The relationship between the phases of the PDM and the developing critical realist non-preservative sublatory critique is indicated schematically in Table 1 .
Classical Modernism
Classical modernism's view of the world (the implicit ontology it secretes) is critiqued by the first phase of critical realism, transcendental realism, as atomistic and actualist. It is structured around (1) ego-and anthropo-centricity or -centrism coupled on to (2) abstract universality, both of which are false or illusory, 'manifestation[s] of the logic of commodification (intrinsic to capitalism) and the reification and alienation … it produces', 48 and fundamentally at odds with the moral alethia of the species. The figure of centrism, which is grounded in the epistemic fallacy, here does duty for any view that takes human being or aspects of human being to be the centre or goal of the/its universe (e.g. egocentrism, Eurocentrism, anthropocentrism). Not just classical modernism but the entire tradition of the PDM, Bhaskar argues, is constituted by this binary structure of 'an ego, be it an individual or a group, class, gender, nation state (or some complex of these) objectively set against a manifold, described in actualistically universal terms, which is the object of the ego's action (manipulation and exploitation) '. 49 This false duality of abstracted ego-identities or centrisms and abstract universality is manifested in the fact that the discourse Note. Columns should be read vertically (developmentally), such that (broadly) T/F > PM > M > HM > CM, and PMR > TDCR > DCR > EC > CN > TR.
both explicitly excludes (thereby experiencing difficulty sustaining its own universality -this is the logic of centrism) and tacitly includes (thereby losing the category of the modern -this is the logic of abstract universality 50 ) a pre-or non-modern Other. 'Thus we have the figure of the intrinsic exterior or past, implicitly secreted in the discourse, below the level of consciousness, as the necessary condition of that discourse, reflecting the exploitation of the excluded in reality, whether the excluded be other individuals, nonbourgeois classes, women, colonized peoples, etc.' 51 -a classic example of a TINA compromise formation.
52 A TINA ('there is no alternative') formation is basically 'the suppression by the false of the truth on which it depends and which sustains it' (recursively committed theory/practice inconsistency), necessarily resulting in emergent error and illusion and exemplifying philosophical unseriousness.
53 So the falsity of the exclusion of the non-modern Other in theory, in the very concept of modernity (or in classist, patriarchal, racist, etc., discourses), comes up against the truth of the inclusion of the exploited Other in practice -the Other is in the One, the slave in the master, the periphery in the centre (etc.) in that the One is crucially dependent on the Other, and both are part of an only tacitly acknowledged totality. 54 Classical modernism's totality is therefore (3) detotalized or incomplete and self-refuting (selfcontradictory), and (4) lacking in reflexivity. Abstract universality projects sectional interests as universal (Bhaskar 2002b, 26-7) . 51 Bhaskar 2002b, 168-9, original emphasis.
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'[T]he actual constitution of the presumed superior or privileged term … of necessity presupposed in practice and derived its own superiority from the existence and exploitation of the inferior or suppressed term' (Bhaskar 2002b, 170) . 53 Bhaskar 2002a, 219; see also [1993] 2008, 116-9. The fundamental thrust of Bhaskar's metacritique of the entire Western philosophical tradition is that it is a giant philosophical TINA formation in resonance with a social one (master-slave-type society). The critical realist critique operates at the levels both of social forms and of philosophy. See Bhaskar 2002b , 17 and [1994 Hartwig 2010. 54 As Enrique Dussel has argued in relation to Europe's colonized Other, the experience of conquest and exploitation of other peoples is 'essential to the constitution of the modern ego, not only as a subjectivity, but as subjectivity that takes itself to be the center or end of history' (Dussel [ ] 1995 . For Dussel, the conquest and exploitation of the Other -a process involving not one, but three holocausts (Indigenous peoples and enslaved Africans as well as Jews) -has been rationalized by an 'irrational sacrificial myth' of modernity, the other side of the coin of its 'rational emancipatory nucleus' (Dussel [ ] 1996 cf. Horkheimer and Adorno [1947] 1973) . This myth makes the conqueror and exploiter the hero, and the victim responsible for their own victimization, and is a persistent theme in the discourse of modernity from the conquest of the Americas to the Gulf Wars. One of its key philosophical sources, as Dussel points out, is Kant's view that 'Enlightenment is the exit of humanity from its culpable immaturity … Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why so large a part of humanity, long after nature has released them from alien guidance (naturaliter maiorennes), nevertheless gladly remain in lifelong immaturity, The atomistic ego of modernity, on the critical realist account of the self, is an illusion: it is real in terms of causal efficacy, of course, but lacks a real object. 55 On this account, people are not disconnected egos but embodied personalities with transcendentally real selves or ground-states, profoundly interrelated at the level of the social, human biology and the fundamental states of the universe. 56 The absence of an ego is actually tacitly presupposed by many emancipatory discourses. Thus the concept of the eudaimonian society -one in which the free development of each is a condition for the free development of all -presupposes that your flourishing and development is as important to me as my own. This is very similar to the injunctions of Buddhism against the ego or the privileging of one's own standpoint, and for that matter to the implications of the Golden Rule or ethic of reciprocity, solidarity and understanding in Christianity and other religions and in all systems of universalizing ethics. But such an ethic is in no way restricted to religion or explicit emancipatory discourses: it is a hidden or unrecognized feature of everyday life in all societies, necessary for human sociality and social bonding. In critical realism it finds its metatheoretical expression in the principles of dialectical universalizability and universal solidarity, grounded in the concrete universal. Abstract universality, the even more fundamental governing principle of modernity, which finds its most striking manifestation in symbolic logic and money, 57 is contrasted with dialectical universality: the universal does not exist apart from the singular and is highly mediated and changing; together universality, processuality, particular mediations and their concretely singular outcome constitute the concrete universal↔singular. A human being thus consists in a core universal human nature, particular mediations and the rhythmics of her world-line, 'uniquely individuating her … as in effect a natural kind sui generis'. The transcendentally real or essential or alethic self or ground-state is ultimately an implicitly conscious field of possibility interrelated with all other ground-states as 'part of a much bigger quantum field' (Bhaskar 2002b, 92) . The basic idea here is that ultimately there is only one kind of stuff -information-energy or fields of implicitly conscious possibility with bits of root matter enfolded within them -which is ingredient in everything in the multiverse, so everything is interrelated at a fundamental level.
ism's totality in the human sphere, by contrast with that of the PDM, includes everyone on the planet while celebrating the reality and potential of diversity at personal, communal and regional levels.
High Modernism
The false egocentricity and abstract universality of classical modernism were the focus of the critique of classical modernism by high modernism, broadly endorsed by critical realism, which reached its apogee philosophically and theoretically in Marx and ideology-critique and Sigmund Freud. Ideologycritique exposes, first, 'the representation of sectional interests as universal ones ', 59 revealing the 'tacit dependence of the excluding on the excluded' 60 captured in the figure of the intrinsic exterior; and this has been built on by feminism, dependency theory and other movements representing the excluded. Second, it shows the necessary dependence of a false theory on a true ground, prefiguring the theory of the TINA formation. 61 However, in its proneness to 'substitutionism' (which relies on some agent other than yourself to effect desirable social change) and elitism, deriving from the lack of an organic intelligentsia in the Gramscian sense, high modernism is itself vulnerable to some aspects of its own critique -elitism itself represents sectional interests as universal; 62 and to the metaRealist argument for the primacy of self-referentiality or the self-transformation or self-realization of the human subject: emancipatory social change necessarily begins with self-change in this sense, we cannot rely on others (e.g. the working class or elites/experts) to do it for us -we have to do it ourselves. 63 Emancipatory high modernism is additionally vulnerable to the criticism that it presupposes a spirituality that it fails to thematize explicitly or ground adequately, where spirituality is most fundamentally acting in awareness of and consistently with the reality of the hidden non-dual substratum of creativity, love, right-action and freedom that systems of social oppression dominate and occlude even as they depend on them.
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Like classical modernism, high modernism is also (with important exceptions that do not include most Marxism since Marx) typically reductively materialist in outlook. Reductive materialism holds that the world is brutely physical, arguing that any seemingly non-physical phenomenon (e.g. consciousness) fully reduces to some other identified physical entity (e.g. brainstates or neural processes). Such reductionist reification has the consequence of de-agentifying human agency and downplaying 'the enormous creative power of thought'. 65 The critical realist critique of this position was inaugurated by the demonstration of the sui generis reality of mind as an emergent power in Bhaskar's The Possibility of Naturalism 66 and is carried through in the philosophy of metaReality, with its rejection of the notion that Being is exhaustively physical and its espousal of metaphysical realism rather than materialism (or idealism).
Modernization
As Habermas has pointed out, the term 'modernization' was introduced as a technical concept only in the 1950s, the hey-day of functionalist and evolutionary approaches to social theory. 67 Modernization theory and practice was characterized by (5) unilinearity, whereby 'developing' countries would inevitably pass through the same stages of economic and political growth as the Western world, and history as a whole is a story of unilinear progress, with Western countries in the vanguard; critical realism critiques this as a variant of elitism and (in Popper's sense) historicism and shows that its deterministic cast is closely bound up with actualism. 68 There are no laws of historical development inexorably determining a unique sequence; history could have been, just as it could be, very different. Intrinsic to unilinearity was (5') a judgementalism -completely at odds with modernity's own prevalent view that rational judgements concerning matters of value are impossible -whereby 'developed', 'Western' and 'modern' are not only superior to anything inconsistent with themselves but present a model that others must follow; and (5") an accentuated disenchantment of the world, which had been present in the PDM from the outset, whereby the world was increasingly drained of intrinsic meaning and value, which were sourced instead to the self-defining modern subject. During this period disenchantment found expression above all in 65 Bhaskar 2002b, 245.
66 Bhaskar [1979] 1998. 67 Habermas [1985] 1987, 2.
68 Dussel (e.g. [1993] 1996, 4) critiques it as the 'developmentalist fallacy'. Habermas's view ([1985] 1987, 3) that '[t]he theory of modernization … dissociates "modernity" from its modern European origins and stylizes it into a spatio-temporally neutral model for processes of social development in general' is correct in regard of stylization but overlooks that Europe was deemed to have shown and to be showing the way.
Weberian 'rationalization' and the Nietzschean 'death of God', 69 entraining a line of thought that issued in the poststructuralist ' "end of man" (Foucault), "history" (Lyotard) and (through its heat-death) "meaning" (Derrida)'.
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While rejecting any view of geo-history that sees it as an inexorable process of development towards a pre-ordained goal, viewing it rather as a radically open, contingent, uneven and multiform process punctuated by regression and foldback, critical realism does hold that there is a certain 'tendential rational directionality' in history. This is a latent teleology at the level of the social real inscribed, not just in human speech (cf. Apelian and Habermasian discourse ethics, demonstrating the immanent rationality of linguistic intersubjectivity), but more generally in practice as such -a deep yearning and striving for free flourishing immanent in praxis: the pulse of freedom. 71 This notion of 'tendential rational directionality' has been deemed by some to be tainted with Eurocentrism, but the struggle for freedom comes from people wherever they are -from the colonized, the periphery, the subaltern and so on -and to imagine that this is not so is itself a Eurocentric conceit. As Bhaskar has pointed out, the pulse of freedom could have been thematized equally well 'in critical engagement with Chinese, or Indian, or Indigenist philosophy', as with Western.
72 Likewise, in arguing for the re-enchantment of the world, Bhaskar is not arguing for the imposition of an arbitrary transcendent view, wrapping the world once more in the mythic. On the contrary, the argument is that the world is always already enchanted, 73 i.e. intrinsically meaningful and valuable, and that this is obscured by the disenchanted gaze in the smog of the demireal -an emergent level of reality characterized by categorial error, ignorance and illusion that obtains in all master-slave-type societies, but reaches its fullest expression to date in capitalist modernity. In order to see the world for what it really is -enchanted -we must shed the demi-real. 
Postmodernism
Postmodernism, along with the 'new' social movements that accompanied it, is a backlash against the entire tradition of the PDM, aspiring to speak on behalf of all those who were tacitly excluded from it. Above all, perhaps, it is 69 Gauchet [1985 . 70 Bhaskar 2002b Bhaskar Hartwig 2007d. 72 Bhaskar with Hartwig 2010, 138. 73 See e.g. Bhaskar 2002b, 243, n. 35. 74 The concept of demi-reality is first explicitly elaborated in Bhaskar 2000, 6, 33-9 , but had been used in oral presentations from 1994 (Bhaskar, personal communication) . It builds on the theory of the TINA formation. a reaction against the abstractly (actualistically) universalizing tendencies of that discourse, obliterative of identity and difference, which came to a peak in modernization theory and practice. This is a very important corrective from a critical realist point of view; it is a reaction, prefigured by the expressivist 1960s cultural revolution, 'against the logic of Western domination in the name of capitalist globalization'. 75 Unfortunately, however, in the very accentuation in this phase of a new politics of identity and difference the interconnectedness and unity of humanity and indeed living forms was lost. What was missing here was any conception of a dialectical totality, with the crucial concepts of dialectical universality and concrete singularity absent.
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That is to say, postmodernism fails to distinguish between abstract actualist and dialectical universality, 'jettison[ing] universality rather than actualism!'
77
It denegates universality, but is itself a universal modern ideology. The era of postmodernism brought out the (6) formalism and (6') functionalism of the whole tradition, which assumed the non-autonomous plasticity of nature, treated as an object of instrumental reasoning and practice, together with (7) a materialism that was reductionist in theory and mechanical in practice. By formalism Bhaskar means the undialectical 'glorification of formal, analytical, abstract, quantitative modes of reasoning and modes of being' 78 that characterizes the dominant discourses of modernity as a whole; and, relatedly, the prioritization of discursive over intuitive modes of reasoning, which is in part reversed by postmodernism. 79 Philosophically, mechanical materialism downplays the role of ideas and intentionality in geo-history; as manifested in Marxism it never came to terms with the role of consciousness, ideas and intentionality, the defining characteristics of social life, as foundational features of social life. The result was that its own self-understanding and its own practice was acutely limited by a failure to come to terms with the subjective and selftransformative prerequisites of social change.
Substantively, materialism hinges on a sense of the utter separateness of the ego from the rest of the world, which underwrites manipulative treatment of people as well as the world of objects ('with which man … [seeks] to fill his own inner emptiness') and sets up a 'master-slave relationship between the ego or the modern, and the non-ego, other or non-or pre-modern'.
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Postmodernism rejects and displaces this ego, along with universality, but 'the bearer of the deconstructive discourse remains mysterious, unsusceptible to reflexive situation'. 82 Who or what is it that pronounces the disappearance of the ego? Critical realism can agree that the atomistic ego is a (causally efficacious) illusion but it upholds the reality of the embodied personality and of the transcendentally real self or ground-state that underpins and sustains both. 83 Postmodernism's inability to sustain a coherent totality is mirrored in poststructuralism (and also evident in structuralism), which detotalizes the observer from the field she observes. Neither is therefore able 'to sustain any notion of itself'. 84 Crucially, the relationship postmodernism postulates between the postmodern and the modern duplicates the ideological relationship between the modern and the non-modern in the PDM as a whole, and its denial of ontology and of the possibility of a judgementally rational assessment of other positions entails that it cannot sustain a concept of emancipation or indeed its own rationality, causal efficacy or reality. It mistakes a modality of reason -instrumental or strategic rationality, grounded in power 2 social relations 85 
Triumphalism/Fundamentalism
Postmodernism's denial of the possibility of the rational assessment of other positions helped pave the way, with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, for the emphatic reassertion of bourgeois triumphalism and endism, with their underpinning philosophical error of (8) Endism is the view that history, while once real, has come to an end in the present. Thus, according to twentieth-century endism, modernity had a beginning around about 1500, in the light of which its past appears as prehistory, and it has now arrived at an ending, an everlasting posthistory.
94
There will of course continue to be a future, according to this view, but there will be no more qualitative social and institutional change or ideologies of 88 Habermas [1985] Cf. Habermas [1985] 1987, ch. 1, 'Modernity's consciousness of time and its need for self-reassurance', 1-22. change: the future will in this sense be constellationally contained within the present. Applied to our contemporary situation, endism proclaims that there are no alternatives to capitalism. Such denial of the ongoing nature of geo-historicity, or de-geo-historicization, is characteristic of master-classes, because the continuation of geo-history must sooner or later spell the end of their rule, and it is a potent motif of the Western philosophical tradition, which assists in legitimating that rule. 95 Endism is falsified by the irreducibly transformative nature of human praxis, which absents and creates, even as it reproduces, the given. Endism was nicely exemplified in the work of Francis Fukuyama just as the discourse of bourgeois triumphalism was getting seriously under way. 96 Fundamentalism (or foundationalism), whether in the form of market or religious and other fundamentalisms or the theory of epistemology, is the view that one's knowledge is incorrigible or certain because it is based on indubitable principles. It 'inevitably splits reality into two (viz. that which conforms to its criterion and that which does not)', 97 giving rise to the problem of the One and the Other, whether in philosophy or the politics of identity. In contrast to Bhaskar, modernity limits fundamentalism to the attempt to defend the pre-modern or traditional in a traditional way, 98 thereby letting market fundamentalism off the hook. In late modernity fundamentalism is a cousin of postmodernism, like it rejecting universality and unity and accepting the essentiality of difference, but saying 'I'm right and you're wrong' to postmodernism's 'there is no right and wrong'. 99 What fundamentalism ignores is that we can never start from scratch or an indubitable starting point because we are always 'thrown' into an already existing epistemological dialectic or learning process, entailing epistemological relativity and the possibility of critique. It thus arrives at the opposite conclusion to that of its dialectical counterpart, 100 endism or 95 Bhaskar [1993] 2008, 64. Endism and the notion of posthistory contrasts with the Marxian and Bhaskarian view that history proper will begin only after the species moves on from its power 2 -stricken state. In eudaimonian society, far from historicity having ended, it would be embraced and shift up a gear as implicit and stymied human creative potentialities are unlocked and unfolded in an in principle never-ending open evolutionary process, with an emphasis on being and letting be rather than having and controlling. 96 Fukuyama 1992. 97 Bhaskar [1993] 2008, 300. 98 Cf. Giddens 1994 , cit. vandenberghe 2004 , 115 n. 70. 99 Bhaskar 2002b Dialectical counterparts or antagonists are in conflict over relatively superficial matters but necessary to each other in being grounded in (a) common category mistake(s), hence tacitly complicit. So their antagonism or opposition is ultimately phoney, and is revealed as such when overreached by a fuller conceptual formation that makes good the category mistake.
the clash of market fundamentalism in alliance with Christian and perhaps also Jewish fundamentalism, on the one hand, with Islamic fundamentalism on the other, coupled with, and overlaid by, the breaking out of myriad local and petty fundamentalisms, chauvinisms and absolutisms. 
Current Trends
Today there are signs that we are entering a new sub-phase of triumphalism/ fundamentalism characterized by 'a partial return to a multi-polar world (in which the emerging BRIC [Brazil, Russia, India, China] countries provide a partial counter-weight to US hegemony), increasing crises of international law and co-operation and the accentuated urgency of economic and ecological challenges', but under the continued hegemony of market fundamentalism set more than ever on a course of indefinite growth that can only lead to ecological disaster. 105 In such a context of multi-polarity and crisis both externally and within nation-states, there may be greater scope for philosophies of universal free flourishing with their projects of eudaimonia or 'transmodernity' to flourish, and for a beginning to be made at implementing their concrete utopian visions on a planetary scale. 106 A key resource for such philosophies is the idea and reality of 'multiple modernities' co-present and resurgent within the capitalist world-system. This has already helped to entrain a powerful discourse of post-secularity challenging one of the central tenets of the discourse of modernity: the Weberian notion that modernization inexorably leads to the dissolution of religious and spiritual worldviews, issuing in a secular global society. We can expect such trends to continue for the foreseeable future. 107 If, as the Bhaskarian account has it, the economic crises currently besetting globalized humanity have been 'created most fundamentally by a triple disembedding: of money from the real economy; of the real economy from society; and of society from its spiritual infrastructure (or metaReal basis)' 108 and the more general crises by a four-fold alienation of people from nature, each other, their social relations and their essential selves, the solution can only be a triple re-embedding and quadruple dealienation that brings 'system', shorn of its heteronomous elements, within
